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NOTES AND COMNTS

CRIMINAL LAW-PREMEDITATION
INFERRED FROM USE OF DEADLY WEAPON
The deadly weapon doctrine staunchly buttresses a supposed
defect in the common-law murder structure. This doctrine-that intent, the essential element in intentional murder, is to be inferred
where a homicide has been achieved through the use of a deadly
weapon-is generally accepted.' However, the question to be discussed herein is: Should the doctrine be extended to support first degree murder where deliberation and premeditation make the difference in degree? This would mean that deliberation and premeditation would be inferred in the same way as intent where a killing has
been effected through the use of a deadly weapon.
Intent is a subjective fact, rather than a fact of tangible, substantive
matter. For this reason, intent is difficult to prove. Yet it remains the
essential element in common law intentional murder. Faced with the
delimma of this elusive subjective element, the common law sought
and found a solution to the problem in the deadly weapon doctrine.
The rationalization was that a person intends the natural consequences
of his own acts, and if he acts with a deadly weapon, causing another's
death, the law can raise an inference of intent.2 In this way the law
made out his intent by working backwards from the killing: the
homicide was the result of the act (use of a deadly weapon), and the
act was the result of intent. And so, where the deadly weapon doctrine was interjected by the prosecution, the state's case was prima
facie. It meant that the accused had to show to the jury that his use
of a deadly weapon was not evidence of intent-he had to destroy the
state's inference of intent.
A recent Arkansas case3 points up the use of the deadly weapon
doctrine. The deceased was cut on the leg in an altercation in which
the defendant was the aggressor. The defendant was armed with a
knife and severed an artery, from which wound the deceased bled to
death in 20 minutes. The court wrote:
Malice and intent to kill may be implied from the use
of weapons, such as knives, as here, capable of producing edath.
126 Am. Jir. 360.
'Liggins v. United States, 297 F. 881 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Mo-EroN,
HoncmCE 26 (1952).

'Wooten v. State, 249 S.W. 2d 964 (Ark. 1952).
1Id. at 966.
'State v. Utley, 223 N.C. 39, 25 S.E. 2d 195 (1943).
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In another knifing case, 5 the rule was stated:
The law is well established . . . that the intentional killing of a
human being with a deadly weapon implies malice, and, if nothing
else appears, constitutes murder in the second degree.'

Murder was first divided into degrees in 1794 when Pennsylvania
made ".... all murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison,

lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing" murder in the first degree. 7 Other states followed
the Pennsylvania lead, and so premeditation became necessary in those
states to raise homicide to the level of first degree murder where the
theory of the prosecution was based upon a planned, cold-blooded
killing.
With the division of murder into degrees came the problem with
which this note is concerned. Intent had been necessary for common
law intentional murder. The deadly weapon doctrine provided that
element where a deadly weapon was used. But under statuatory first
degree murder, premeditation became the key to conviction. The
murder structure had been added to-a new element was necessary
for the new level, and this new component was even more difficult to
prove than the primary, necessary element in common law murder.
It was buried much deeper in the mind and necessarily had a higher
degree of subjectivity. How to prove premeditation became the new
problem for prosecutors, just as intent had harased their predecessors.
And once again, some turned to the deadly weapon doctrine.
The courts in Virginia were the first to make this application,
using the deadly weapon doctrine to raise an inference of premeditation. This appears to be the law of that state today.8 Hill v. Commonwealth9 in 1845 started Virginia on the road to this solution for the requisite of premeditation. Evidence at the trial showed that the
decedent, a major of the militia, had not appointed the accused, Hill,
as captain of a patrol some months before the killing, and that Hill
"had taken umbrage at the decedent." 10 He had been heard to remark, "'Major Smith must mind how he cuts his cards with me.""'
The evidence also showed that Hill had requested, the decedent to
'leave the company and walk with him under the shade of night," and that the deceased had died from the wound of a dirk near his
at ........ ,25 S.E. 2d at 201.
6Id.
7
MoRELAND, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 200.
'Leigh v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 583, 66 S.E. 2d 586 (1951).
'2
Grattan 594 (Va. 1845).
10
Id. at 601.
"I Id. at 601.

1 Id. at 604.
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heart. The jury found the accused guilty of first degree murder, and
the General Court of Virginia sustained the conviction, writing:
In order to elevate the offense from murder in the second
to murder in the first degree, there must be proof that the accused
deliberated; and that the killing was the result of such deliberation.
This being proved, it is not material how recently the deliberation
preceded the killing. The practical difficulty in cases of this kind, is,
in determining what is sufficient evidence of deliberation. A homicide
rarely declares his intention; nay, he often, under the guise of friendship and kind offices, sedulously conceals his fatal purpose. Often
the resolution to kill may be fixed, but the time and the means not
determined upon. The most wilful, deliberate and premeditated
murders would often go unpunished unless means existed of proving
the intention, independent of the admissions or declarations of the
homicide. We are of the opinion that such means are furnished by the
rule: 'That a man shall be taken to intend that which he does, or
which is the immediate or necessary consequence of his act."'

Then the court illustrated the point with reference to a pistol, saying:
The taking aim, and firing such a weapon, one from
which death would most likely ensue, would itself be prima facie
evidence that he intended it; and was, therefore, a wilful, deliberate
and premeditated killing."'

The Hill case set forth the rule followed by Virginia today, but it
appears from the facts of the case that the reasoning of the court with
reference to the use of the deadly weapon to show premeditation was
unnecessary. The Commonwealth's case was very strong even without
the use of the doctrine. It appears that the court could have sustained
the verdict without having to resort to the application now in discussion. In fact, in reviewing the case, the court asked, "Are not these
circumstances sufficient?" 15 The query was put forth with reference to
all the circumstances tending to show premeditation. But the court
did adopt the disputed doctrine, and apparently the reason for doing

so was the same rationalization which originally created the deadly
weapon doctrine. "A person intends the natural consequences of his
own acts" thus echoed again to buttress the new rule with reason.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 6 a 1947 Virginia case, illustrates the
rule today in that state and possibly17 in some other jurisdictions:
1 Id.

at 599.

"Id. at 600.

Id.at 604.

"186 Va. 131, 41 S.E. 2d 476 (1947).
People v. Hills, 80 Cal. 2d 694, 185 P. 2d 11 (1947); The People v.
Beolaba, 17 Cal. 389 (1861); State v. Brinte et al., 4 Pennewill 551, 58 A. 258
(Del. 1904); State v. Burdette, 63 S.E. 2d 69 (W. Va. 1950); State v. Panetta,
85 W. Va. 212., 101 S.E. 360 (1919).
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A mortal wound, given with a deadly weapon in the
previous possession of the slayer without any or on very slight provocation... [is a prima facie case of first degree murder.] 8

The Virginia application-that the use of a deadly weapon in
effecting a homicide raises an inference of a "premeditated" design or
plan to kill has a certain persuasiveness. It may be argued that the
very fact that the killer selected a death weapon indicates that he
"premeditated" death to his victim. However, the extension of the
deadly weapon doctrine as a means of making out the premeditation
requisite for murder in the first degree has not been followed to any
appreciable degree in other jurisdictions. Indeed, it has been said:
"The better rule, perhaps, refuses to imply premeditation from the
mere use of the weapon, requiring, further, that deliberation in its
manner of employment also be made to appear."19
State v. Phillips,20 a 1902 Iowa case, reasons that the application
seems to go to the extent of holding that intent to kill necessarily implies deliberation and premeditation. The court said that this would
make one inference the basis of another, which of course, cannot be
done. "Literally construed, it makes murder in the first degree of every
intentional homicide."21 Other cases have refused the application be22
cause of the nature of the intent necessary for first degree murder.
Some writers23 would attack the application through an attack upon
the originaldeadly weapon doctrine by contending that even there the
difficulty in obtaining proof to rebut or counteract the inference in
certain cases is a most serious objection. This objection would be
even stronger to the extended doctrine. The high degree of subjectivity of the element of premeditation also comes to the defense of
the majority. If premeditation and deliberation are so difficult to
' Thomas v. Commonwealth 186 Va. 131 at ......... 41 S.E. 2d 476 at 479
(1947).
26 Am. JuR. 361.
118 Iowa 660, 92 N.W. 876 (1902), which says, at 882: "The inference, so
far as inference in such cases may be allowed, is of murder in the second degree,
leaving it to the state to establish, if it can, the elements of deliberation and
premeditation necessary to raise the crime to the first degree, and to the defendant
to reduce it to manslaughter if he can by rebutting the presumption of malice."
'Id. at ........ , 92 N.W. at 882.
" Cases contra to extension: State of North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 F. 734
(W.D.N.C. 1896); Coats v. State, 253 Ala. 290, 45 So. 2d 35 (1950); State v.
Johnson, 221 Iowa 8, 264 N.W. 596 (1936), citing State v. Woodmansee, 212
Iowa 596, 233 N.W. 725 (1930); People v. Vinunzo, 212 Mich. 472, 180 N.W.
502 (1920); Ex Parte Johnson, 280 S.W. 702 (Mo. 1926); State v. Lamm, 232
N.C. 402, 21 S.E. 2d 188 (1950), citing State v. Miller, 197 N.C. 445, 149 S.E.
590 (1929); State v. Cunningham, 178 Ore. 25, 144 P. 2d 303 (1942); Bass v.
State, 231 S.W. 2d 707 (Tenn. 1950); State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 592,
126 P. 2d 1047 (1942).
"MoRELAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27, and REPORT OF LAW REv. Com,. OF
N.Y. 539, note 36 (1937).
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prove, then they are equally difficult to disprove, if they are inferred.
It is further argued that if the primary purpose in instituting degrees
of murder is looked at-to relieve the harshness of the punishment of
all murder by death (as in England) by limiting the use of the death
penalty to the most heinous crimes-then the application of the
doctrine to include premeditation and deliberation seems destructive
of the practical purpose of the two degrees of murder. The very purpose of creating and using the two degrees is defeated in a great
majority of the cases.
It would seem that the best solution to the problem is to allow the
jury to determine premeditation and deliberation from all the facts of
the case. People v. Vinunzo24 expressed this opinion (in citing from
the brief of counsel for the people the summarized rule as announced
25
in People v. Potteri
):
"The use of the lethal weapon is not in itself sufficient
evidence to warrant a verdict of murder in the first degree, but in
addition to this there must be evidence in the case, as to circumstances
surrounding the killing or the manner in which the weapon is used,
from which a logical inference may be drawn that there is willfulness,
deliberation, and premeditation."'

And Alabama states the same rule in a different way:
The essential constituents of murder in the first degree
... are that the taking of life must have been willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated. These must concur and coexist or,
whatever other offense may be committed, this offense of statuatory
creation is not committed. There is no possible state of facts from
which the law presumes their concurrence and coexistence; and their
concurrence and coexistence is not a fact to which a witness, or any
number of witnesses, can testify. It is a matter of inference from all
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.'

It is believed that the deadly weapon doctrine should not be extended to infer premeditation and deliberation. The reasons behind
the majority rule as outlined above seem to support this conclusion.
The application necessarily includes not only "premeditation", but also
"simple intent." The two concepts were separated by the murder degree statutes, and if the deadly weapon doctrine can be used to make
out both, then the purpose of the statutes is defeated. The first degree
of murder was meant to be a distinctly different degree of murder;
it was meant to be delicately balanced by the legislators. The death
penalty was meant to be distinctly limited. To extend the deadly
"212 Mich. 472, 180 N.W. 502 (1920).
"5 Mich. 1 (1858).
Supra note 24 at ......... 180 N.W. at 508.
"Coats v. State, 253 Ala. 290 at ........ 45 So. 2d 35 at 88 (1950).

KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL

weapon doctrine to the highest degree of murder would result in
destroying the distinction between the two degrees, and thus, in effect,
invalidate murder in the first degree.
DICK DOYLE

BREACH OF WARRANTY OF FITNESS AS FAILURE OF
CONSIDERATION-MEYER V. LAND
In determining whether a breach of warranty of fitness for purpose
intended can also constitute failure of consideration, we must look
first at the nature of the warranty and the instances in which it has
been deemed part of the primary consideration.1 Both at common
law2 and under the Uniform Sales Act3 an implied warranty of fitness
arises when goods are sold for a specific purpose. That is, when a
buyer makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which he
needs certain goods, and relies on the seller's judgment in procuring
the goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods are suitable for
that purpose. 4 It is found, however, that in certain instances this concept does not provide relief to a vendee who discovers that he has
purchased an article which he cannot use.
In England no rescission is permitted for breach of warranty if the
property in the goods has passed to the buyer. 5 Thus, if the vendee
finds his purchases unsuitable for the purpose intended, he must seek
recession under a different theory. This theory is failure of consideration. Having had its inception in the law of contracts rather than the
law of sales, this familiar doctrine was placed in an unusual setting by
the court in the leading case of Young v. Cole.6 In that case certain
bonds which the vendor held out to be marketable negotiable instruments were, in truth, worthless pieces of paper. Rescission could not

I By "primary consideration" the writer is referring to that consideration which
must be present before a valid agreement can be'effected under basic principles of
contract law, as distinguished from secondary obligations such as warranties.
'MADDEN, UNIFoEM SALEs AcT 25 (1923); HmLLRD, SALms 254 (1860); 4
MEcim, SALES 1160 (1901); see also Griffin v. Williams, 305 Ky. 18, 202 S.W.
2d 744 (1947).

'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15(1).
'Thus, if the requisite reliance is present and the article fails to meet the
particular use for which it was purchased, the buyer can recover damages on this
type of warranty. For example, see Brandenburg v. Samuel Stores, 211 Iowa 1321,
235 N.W. 741 (1931) (wherein a fur coat, purchased from a retailer, was found
to be unfit as an article of wearing apparel); also see 46 AM. Jun. 529 et seq.
(1943); 2 BENJAMIN, Sales 867 (rev. ed. 1889).
'The leading English case is Street v. Blay, 109 Eng. Rep. 1212 (1831);
VoLD, SA Es 497 (1931); 3 WILLISTON, SA. s 321 (rev. ed. 1948).
'3 Bing. (N.C.) 724, 132 Eng. Rep. 589 (1837) and cases cited therein.

